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as “when it is without a rational basis or reasonable explanation.”5 Thus, this provides the union 
reasonable discretion to make “decisions and choices, even if those judgments are ultimately 
wrong.”6 Accordingly, to show arbitrary conduct, the act must be far outside the “wide range of 
reasonableness.”7 
A.  A Court Considers a Union’s Conduct when Reviewing Conduct under the 
Arbitrary Prong  
 
In determining whether a union’s conduct is wholly irrational and therefore arbitrary, courts 
evaluate the conduct on a continuum with two distinct ends.8 “On one end of the continuum is 
intentional conduct by a union exercising its judgment.”9 This type of conduct is usually not 
considered arbitrary, as it is not usually considered “wholly irrational.”10 On the other end are 
“actions or omissions that are unintentional, irrational or wholly inexplicable, such as an 
irrational failure to perform a ministerial or procedural act.”11 Courts usually refer to these types 
of ministerial or procedural acts or omissions as arbitrary.12  These arbitrary actions can breach 
the duty of fair representation when such actions cause injury to a union member.13 In deciding 
where in the continuum a union’s action falls, a court will review the process taken by a union to 
render a decision and the statements made to union members.14  
For example, it is arbitrary for a union to agree to file a grievance with a union worker, and 
then fail to timely do so.15  This type of act constitutes a procedural omission that constitutes a 
breach of fiduciary duty.  This is illustrated in Beck v. United Food and Commercial Workers 
                                                
5 Id. (internal citation omitted).  
6 Beck, 506 F.3d 874 at 879. (internal citation omitted). 
7 Id. 
8 See id.   
9 Id.   
10 See id.  
11 Id.   
12 See Beck, 506 F.3d 874 at 879. 
13 See id. 
14 See Demetris v. Local 514, Transp. Workers Union of Am., 862 F.3d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 2017).   
15 See Beck, 506 F.3d 874 at 879. 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
Union, where the plaintiff’s union failed to file a timely grievance after plaintiff was issued a 
“Final Written Warning” from her employer after using profanity at work.16  The union has 
discretion on whether or not to file a grievance, but in Beck the union agreed to file the grievance 
but failed to do so.17 The Court emphasized the fact that the union agreed to file the grievance, 
expressly informed the plaintiff it was going to file, then chose not to file the grievance.18 This 
constituted an “arbitrary” action.19 
On the other end of the spectrum, however, is a union’s duty to negotiate and enforce a 
security clause; a clause explicitly authorized by the NLRA.20 A union’s decision to negotiate a 
security clause has widely been accepted as “far from arbitrary.”21 For example, in Marquez v. 
Screen Actors Guild, plaintiff alleged that the union failed to fairly represent her by negotiating 
and enforcing a union security clause that did not contain language informing her of her right to 
not join the union and to pay for only the union’s representational activities.22 Plaintiff argued 
that the union had the duty to fully explain the security clause because that is the only part of the 
contract where the union’s interests diverge from its members.23 Ultimately, the court held that 
the union “tracked the statutory language,” and thus its conduct was not “arbitrary.”24 
II. Conduct is Discriminatory if it is Intentionally Aimed to Enhance One Group 
Over Another  
 
Unions cannot discriminate against its members.25 Nor can a union make decisions solely to 
advance one employee over another.26 For a union to be found to be engaging in discriminatory 
                                                
16 See Beck, 506 F.3d 874 at 881. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
19 Id. 
20 See Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33, 43-44 (1998).   
21 Id. at 44-45. 
22 See id. at 40. 
23 See id.  
24 See id. at 46.  
25 See Demetris v. Local 514, Transp. Workers Union of Am., 862 F.3d 799, 809. (9th Cir. 2017).   
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
conduct, there must be “‘substantial evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe and 
unrelated to legitimate union objective.’”27 
There is no requirement, however, “that unions treat their members identically as long as 
their actions are related to legitimate union objectives.”28 This is especially true in circumstances 
where the employer has filed for bankruptcy.29 However, a union may not discriminate based on 
whether an employee is a union member. 30 For example, in Bernard v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n 
Intern., a union’s actions were found to constitute discrimination against certain pilots who were 
not unionized.  In Bernard, Jet America was an independent air carrier who was acquired by 
Alaska Air Group, Inc. (“Alaska”).31 Air Line Pilots Association (“ALPA”), the union for 
Alaska, met with Alaska to determine how to integrate the Jet America pilots with the Alaska 
pilots for purposes of seniority and possible reductions in force.32 Jet America pilots brought the 
action stating that they were excluded from the bargaining process.33 At the time of the 
bargaining process, ALPA did not officially represent the Jet America Pilots, but would be the 
union representative after the merger.34 ALPA did not acknowledge the Jet America Pilots in the 
seniority agreement with Alaska.35 The Ninth Circuit held that the effect of ALPA’s “approach 
[was] to discriminate against the Jet America pilots because they were not unionized prior to the 
merger.”36 
                                                                                                                                                       
26 See id.  
27 Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. of Am. v. Lockridge 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971). 
28 Bondurant v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Intern., 679 F.3d 386, 393. (6th Cir. 2012).   
29 See id.  
30 See Bernard v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Intern., 873 F.2d 213, 216-217 (9th Cir. 1989). 
31 See id. at 214. 
32 See id.  
33 See id.  
34 See id. at 215-16. 
35 See id. at 217.   
36 Id.   
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, in a restructuring agreement, it is not discriminatory to 
create a bright line cutoff date for eligibility into a compensation program that might negatively 
affect retirees.37 This was the situation in Bondurant v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Intern. where, 
during an employer bankruptcy, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a union was trying to make the 
“best out of a bad situation” and not everyone’s interests could possibly be satisfied.38 In 
Bondurant, Northwest Airlines filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.39 “During its reorganization, 
Northwest extracted concessions from the union that collectively resulted in an approximate 40% 
wage cut for all Northwest pilots.”40 “Northwest set out terms of the Bankruptcy Restructuring 
Agreement for which an $888 million claim was intended to compensate.”41 The Master 
Executive Council, composed of pilot representatives, appointed an Eligibility Committee to 
issue a recommendation on how to approach the distribution.42 The committee established a 
cutoff date for distributing the claim of July 31, 2006.43 The plaintiffs, retirees who had reached 
the age of sixty and left Northwest before July 31, 2006, were not entitled to a share of the 
claim.44 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that “the union was trying to make 
the best out of a bad situation, and it was almost inevitable that the union's drawing would hurt 
someone.”45 Just because the retirees did not “similarly benefit” does not mean that the union 
breached its duty of fair representation.46 The retirees did not plead any facts that would lead the 
Sixth Circuit to believe anything differently.47 
                                                
37 See Bondurant v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Intern., 679 F.3d 386, 393. (6th Cir. 2012).   
38 See id.  
39 See id. at 390. 
40 Id.   
41 Id. 
42 See id. at 391. 
43 See id.   
44 See id.    
45 Id. (internal citation omitted).   
46 Id. at 394.   
47 See Bondurant, 679 F.3d 386, at 394. 
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III. Conduct is Considered Committed in Bad Faith if it can be proven there is 
Substantial Evidence of Fraud, Deceitful Action or Dishonesty in the Conduct. 
 
To establish a breach of the duty to fairly represent under the “bad faith” prong, the 
plaintiff must show "substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct.”48 In 
the Beck case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the union committed bad 
faith by not representing female and male employees similarly.49 The court held that the union’s 
misfiling of plaintiff’s original grievance that she asked to be filed on her behalf was not "mere 
negligence" but treated plaintiff’s claim "'so lightly as to suggest an egregious disregard of her 
rights."50 The court affirmed the district court's decision that failure to file two grievances 
requested by plaintiff amounted to bad faith and therefore breached the duty of fair 
representation.51 At the trial, plaintiff introduced evidence that a male employee who was subject 
to multiple disciplinary actions, including actions that were similar to plaintiff’s, was not fired.52 
Another male employee had been suspended after he fought with an employee and, unlike with 
plaintiff, the union chose to represent him in getting his job reinstated.53 Further, the union did 
not represent a female employee who was terminated for allegedly extending the expiration date 
on meat.54 The district court found the mishandling of plaintiff’s grievances were motivated by 
gender discrimination.55 The Ninth Circuit affirmed that the union breached the duty of fair 
representation because it committed bad faith.56 
                                                
48 See Beck v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 506 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation 
omitted).   
49 See id. at 882 (holding that “[plaintiff’s] termination was not entitled to deference because it was tainted by the 
union’s intentional gender discrimination and bad faith conduct). 
50 Id. at 881 (internal citation omitted).   
51 See id. at 882.   
52 See id. at 877. 
53 See id.  
54 See id.  
55 See Beck 506 F.3d 874, at 878.   
56 See id. at 882. 
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“Mere negligence and erroneous judgment calls” cannot, however, by themselves, 
support an inference of bad faith57. In Stevens v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., appellants were 
employed by Moore.58 Moore announced that it would have to close one of its plants.59 Moore 
paid its union employees severance pay equal to the amount required under the collective 
bargaining agreement.60 The severance pay amount received by Moore's bargaining unit 
employees “was substantially less than that received by non-bargaining unit employees.”61 The 
union members filed a grievance with their union, claiming “discrimination on the basis of their 
union membership;” the union did not process the grievance.62 Because the union did not file the 
grievance, appellants argued that the union breached its duty of fair representation.63 The Ninth 
Circuit held that the appellants offered no evidence of bad faith but actually offered evidence 
stating that they were paid per their collective bargaining agreement.64 
 Conclusion  
 
A union faces unique challenges when trying to fairly represent its constituency. A union 
will breach its duties to its members, where actions taken are arbitrary, discriminatory or 
committed in bad faith.  In order to prevent such a finding, a union must take steps to document a 
thorough, reasoned approach to each decision it makes. Through this approach, a union should 
be able to successfully counter allegations of breach of its duty of fair representation.  
 
                                                
57 Stevens v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 18 F.3d 1443, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1994). 
58 See id. at 1445. 
59 See id.  
60 See id.  
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
63 See id.   
64 See id. at 1148-49. 
